This paper models an overlapping-generations economy that includes money and is populated with individuals of di¤erent skills. They face a nonlinear income tax schedule and can engage in tax evasion. Money serves two purposes: the traditional one, modeled through a money-in-the-utility-function, and to facilitate tax evasion. It shows that income tax evasion leads to the violation of the Friedman rule that will otherwise hold.
Introduction
Milton Friedman's (1969) doctrine regarding the "optimum quantity of money" -according to which an optimal monetary policy would involve a steady contraction of the money supply at a rate su¢ cient to bring the nominal interest rate down to zero -is undoubtedly one of the most celebrated propositions in modern economic theory. 1 This paper brings two strands of public …nance literature to bear on the question of the Friedman rule (1969) for the optimal money supply. One is the optimal Mirrleesian taxation that started with Mirrlees (1971) and was popularized by Stiglitz (1982) in its simpli…ed two-group version; the second is the tax evasion literature that followed the pioneering work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) . Our paper di¤ers from the previous contributions on this topic with the "same" three ingredients in that it adopts a Mirrleesian rather than a Ramsey approach to optimal taxation. 2 It is now well-known that the Friedman rule is a …rst-best prescription and may or may not hold in second-best settings. This depends on the nature of the second-best (existence of distortionary taxes or intrinsic reasons for market failure), the set of tax instruments available to the government, and the structure of individuals'preferences. 3 Chari et al. (1991, 1996) , in the context of a model with identical and in…nitely-lived individuals, related the optimality of Friedman rule in the presence of distortionary taxes to the uniform commodity tax result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1974) . This latter result states that if preferences are separable in labor supply and non-leisure goods, with the subutility for goods being homothetic, optimal commodity taxes are proportionately uniform. They showed that deviations from Friedman rule 1 The classic reference for the Friedman rule is Friedman (1969) . The earlier literature referred to it also as the Chicago rule; see Niehans (1978) . 2 Examples of the literature that examines the relevance of tax evasion for the Friedman rule from a Ramsey tax perspective include Nicolini (1998) , Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) , Koreshkova (2006) , and Arbex and Turdaliev (2011) . 3 Non-optimality of Friedman rule in the presence of distortionary taxes was …rst discussed by Phelps (1973) . A selective reference to other sources of distortion include: van der Ploeg and Alogoskou…s (1994) for an externality underlying endogenous growth; Ireland (1996) for monopolistic competition; Erceg et al. (2000) and Khan et al. (2003) for nominal wage and price settings; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe violates this tax principle. 4 These studies, being carried out in an environment with identical individuals, are by construct silent on the validity of the Friedman rule when monetary policy has redistributive implications. 5 A second related drawback of these studies is their reliance on the Ramsey tax framework, which assumes that all tax instruments, including the income tax, are set linearly. 6 In a recent contribution, da Costa and Werning (2008) break with this tradition and consider the optimality of the Friedman rule in a model with heterogeneous agents and allow the government to levy nonlinear income taxes. Interestingly, they show that the Friedman rule is optimal in their setting (for any social welfare function that redistributes from the rich to the poor). As with Chari et al. 's (1991, 1996) earlier result, da Costa and Werning's (2008) …nding is also related to the uniform taxation result in public …nance, albeit a di¤erent one. Whereas Chari et al. (1991 Chari et al. ( , 1996 ) draw on Sandmo's tax uniformity (1974) result derived within a Ramsey setting, da Costa and Werning's (2008) has its roots in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) . This classic paper on the design of tax structures was particularly concerned with the usefulness of commodity taxes in the presence of a general income tax in economies with heterogeneous agents. 7 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) proved that with a general income tax, if preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and goods, then commodity taxes are not needed as instruments of optimal tax policy. With non-separability, one wants to tax the goods that are "substitutes" with labor supply and subsidize those that are "complements" 4 This uniformity result is derived within the context of the traditional one-consumer Ramsey problem. As such, the result embodies only e¢ ciency considerations. Redistributive goals do not come into play. 5 With the exception of intergenerational redistributive issues that arise in overlapping generations models; see, e.g., Weiss (1980) , Abel (1987) , and Gahvari (1988) . 6 See, e.g., Chari et al. (1991 Chari et al. ( , 1996 , Teles (1996, 1999) , Guidotti and Vegh (1993) , and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 7 The ine¤ectiveness of commodity taxes and their proportionately uniform structure boil down to the same thing. In the absence of exogenous incomes, the government has an extra degree of freedom in setting its income and commodity tax instruments. This is because all demand and supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in consumer prices. In consequence, the government can, without any loss of generality, set one of the commodity taxes at zero (i.e. set one of the commodity prices at one). Under this normalization, uniform rates imply absence of commodity taxes.
with labor supply. In da Costa and Werning (2008) the uniformity result, which implies a zero nominal interest rate, holds with preference separability. With non-separable preferences, da Costa and Werning assume that real cash balances and labor supply are complements so that cash balances should be subsidized. This implies that the optimal nominal interest rate is negative. But given the non-negativity of nominal interest rate, the zero interest rate emerges as the "optimal" policy. 8 There are no such studies to date using the Mirrleesian tax framework.
We prove that the absence of tax evasion is crucial for da Costa and Werning's (2008) results. First, when agents have access to a misreporting technology, which allows them to shelter part of their earned income from the tax authority, monetary policy becomes another useful instrument for redistribution. This is the case because income tax evasion invalidates the uniform commodity tax result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) as a boundary solution if real cash balances and labor supply are complements, is no longer guaranteed either. This is because, in the presence of tax evasion, one does not know which type of agents supplies more labor (at the same level of reported income).
Hence the complementarity assumption does not identify the type who demands more real cash balances.
Other interesting issues we discuss include the role of money in the economy. We allow for money to have two distinct usages. One is for the traditional (non-evading) reasons modeled by allowing real cash balances to enter the utility function; the other is to facilitate tax evasion. Another issue concerns the relevance of individual types who are the recipients of money injections. We show that, for a given monetary rate of growth, the …scal authority can o¤set the redistributive e¤ects of who gets the extra money by adjusting the individuals' income tax payments. Put di¤erently, in the presence of a general income tax, who receives the money injection is of no consequence. One other result is that even in the absence of tax evasion, complementarity of real cash balances and labor supply does not guarantee the optimality of the FR as a boundary solution. da Costa and Werning's (2008) result to the contrary arises because there is no di¤erential commodity taxes in their model. In a …nal section, we show that our results are robust with respect to the modeling of the number of agent types in the economy, the modeling of income tax evasion whether riskless by incurring a concealment cost or as a risky activity subject to audits, and the possibility of commodity tax evasion.
The model
Consider a two-period overlapping generations (hereafter OLG) model wherein individuals work in the …rst period and consume in both. 9 There is no bequest motive. Prefer- 9 Studies that use money-in-the-utility-function in conjunction with an overlapping-generations model include Weiss (1980) , Abel (1987) and Gahvari (1988) . In the late 70s and early 80s, the overlappinggenerations model was considered as a substitute for Hicks-Patinkin money-in-the-utility-function and Clower cash-in-advance constructs in rationalizing money. However, it was not too long before it was realized that, in the words of McCallum (1983): "As a 'model of money', the basic OG structure-which excludes cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) appendages-seems inadequate and ences are represented by the strictly quasi-concave utility function U = u (c t ; d t+1 ; x t ; L t ) where c denotes consumption when young, d consumption when old, x real money balances (held for non-evading activities) 10 , and L labor supply; subscript t denotes calendar time. While the utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing in c t and d t+1 , and strictly decreasing in L t , the possibility of satiation in real balances is not ruled out (i.e. lim x!x sat @u=@x = 0 at the "satiation level"x sat ). Each generation consists of two types of individuals who di¤er in skill levels (labor productivity). High-skilled workers are paid w h t and low-skilled workers wt ; with w h t > wt . The proportion of agents of type j; j t ; j = h;`, remains constant over time. Denote the number of young agents of type j born in period t by n j t and the total number of young agents by N t : We have n j t =N t j t = j : Population grows at a constant rate, g. Production takes place through a linear technology with di¤erent types of labor as inputs. Transfer of resources to the future occurs only through a storage technology with a …xed (real) rate of return, r. 11 We thus work with an OLG model à la Samuelson (1958) and assume away the issues related to capital accumulation.
Money and monetary policy
At the beginning of period t; before consumption takes place, the young purchase all the existing stock of money, M t ; from the old. Denote a young j-type agent's purchases by m j t . We have
The rate of return on money holdings (the nominal interest rate), i t+1 , is related to the in ‡ation rate, ' t+1 , according to Fisher equation
potentially misleading, the reason being that it neglects the medium-of-exchange property of money" (p 36), and "...there is no particular reason why cash-in-advance, MIUF, or other appendages designed to re ‡ect the medium-of-exchange property should not be used in conjunction with the OG framework" (p 37). 1 0 Later in this section, we discuss the usage of money for evasion. 1 1 An alternative assumption is that agents borrow and lend on international capital markets at an exogenously …xed interest rate.
Denote the price level at time t by p t ; the in ‡ation rate is de…ned as
The monetary authority injects money into (or retires money from) the economy at the constant rate of . Money is given to (or taken from) the old-who hold all the stock of money-via lump-sum monetary transfers (or taxes). Thus a young j-type agent who purchases m j t at the beginning of time t receives e j t+1 at the beginning of period t + 1. Clearly, e h t+1 and et +1 must satisfy the "money injection relationship",
Beyond this, we do not specify how much of the extra money injection goes to which type. Indeed, an important message of our paper is to argue that this division is immaterial (as shown in subsection 4.1 below).
With money stock changing at the rate of in every period,
Substitute for M t and M t+1 , from equation (1), into this relationship:
Given that the population of each type grows at the constant rate of g, one can rewrite this as 12
Assume that the money-holdings of each type changes in the same direction. 13 It follows from the above relationship that 1 3 This assumption applies only to the sign and not the magnitude of such possible changes. Observe also that this is an assumption on the equilibrium money holdings as opposed to money purchases that may very well go in di¤erent directions depending on who gets the new money injections (or loses them). It is a natural assumption because there are no stochastic shocks in this model so that in going from one year to the next the opportunity sets and the prices faced by di¤erent agent types change in the same manner. Nor does the government follow a capricious redistributive policy changing the social welfare weights of di¤erent groups from one year to the next. If goods including real cash balances are normal, both types end up changing all their consumption levels in the same direction.
Finally, given the empirical observation that evasion is often associated with larger cash holdings, we posit that money has two usages. One is for the traditional (nonevading) reasons and modeled by allowing its "real" value, x, to enter the utility function; the other is used solely to facilitate tax evasion. This latter part is assumed proportional to the amount of income concealed from the tax authority. Let a j t > 0 denote income concealed by the j-type individual at time t. To make this possible, the evader must hold p t a j t in cash over and above p t x j t that he holds for other reasons where is a positive constant less than one. Consequently, total "real money balances" in our model is equal to
Fiscal policy
The tax authority levies income and commodity taxes to maximize a social welfare function de…ned over the utility of all agents in the economy. The government knows the distribution of types in the population but it does not know the identity of the types.
Consequently, type-speci…c lump-sum taxes are not implementable. Earned incomes are not publicly observable either. Income reported by agents for tax purposes may thus deviate from true earned income due to the possibility of income-misreporting. To model income-misreporting in the simplest possible way, we begin by following the riskless approach introduced by Usher (1986) and since then used in a number of subsequent contributions. 14 Later on, in Section 7, we consider how our results may be a¤ected if one were to model income misreporting as a risky activity, which can be discovered by the tax authority through costly audits and punished according to a penalty function.
Under the riskless approach, instead, once agents have incurred some pecuniary cost that depends on the amount they misreport, they face no risk of detection. What the …scal authority can rely on is thus taxing income reported by agents, which will be denoted by I t ; via a general nonlinear income tax T (I t ).
With the true income being equal to w t L t ; the amount of income concealed is equal 1 4 See, e. to a t = w t L t I t . The cost of misreporting is expressed by means of the function f (a t ) : Assume that f ( ) is non-negative, increasing in the absolute value of a t and strictly convex with f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0. 15 Finally, assume that the information the tax authority has on transactions, including money holdings, is of anonymous nature; it does not know the identity of the purchasers. This assumption, which is made for realism, implies that goods can be taxed only linearly (possibly at di¤erent rates).
Constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations
To characterize the (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, one has to account for the economy's resource balance, the standard incentive compatibility constraints due to our informational structure, and the implementability constraints caused by linearity of commodity taxes-itself due to informational constraint, as well as the monetary expansion mechanism. To this end, we derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-speci…c before-tax reported labor incomes, 16 To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an individual for a given mechanism c ; d ; ; e t+1 ; z t ; I t . This is necessitated by the fact that 1 5 While we often speak of under-reporting and tax evasion (at > 0), in principle, over-reporting (at < 0) is also possible. Over-reporting is an optimal strategy when an agent faces a negative marginal income tax rate. In turn, the possibility of a negative marginal income tax arises because of the existence of commodity taxes, and in our model also in ‡ation, in the system (see, e.g., Edwards et al. , 1994) . None of our results depends on the sign of at:
Observe also that no extra cash holding is required with over-reporting. Consequently, if at < 0 then = 0 so that a j t vanishes and equation (6) simpli…es to x j t = m j t =pt: 1 6 This formulation assumes that consumption expenditures are not publicly observable at a personal level. Strictly speaking, this procedure does not characterize allocations as such; the optimization is over a mix of quantities and prices. However, given the commodity prices, utility maximizing households would choose the quantities themselves. We can thus think of the procedure as indirectly determining the …nal allocations.
the mechanism determines personal consumption levels only indirectly, namely through prices. The mechanism assigns the sextuple c ; d ; ; e j t+1 ; z j t ; I j t to a young individual who reports his type as j. The individual will then allocate z j t ; and any other disposable income that he may have, between …rst-and second-period consumption, and real money balances.
Formally, given any vector c ; d ; ; e t+1 ; z t ; I t , an individual of type j chooses c t , d t+1 , x t and a t to maximize
subject to the per-period budget constraints
where s t is the level of real savings chosen by the agent. Observe that does not explicitly appear in the problem above; it does so implicitly through its e¤ect on i t+1 .
Equations (8)- (9) can be uni…ed (see the Appendix) into the following intertemporal budget constraint for the young:
Observe that i t+1 = (1 + i t+1 ) is the opportunity cost of holding one dollar in cash so that f (a t ) + i t+1 a t = (1 + i t+1 ) is the total cost of concealing a t .
The problem of a young j-type, who is facing the sextuple c ; d ; ; e t+1 ; z t ; I t , is to choose c t ; d t+1 ; x t ; and a t in order to maximize (7) subject to (10) . The …rst-order conditions for this problem are
Conditions (11)- (13), along with the individual's intertemporal budget constraint (10), yield the conditional demands for the j-type's …rst-and second-period consumption, real money balances, and the concealed labor income. For ease of notation, introduce
One can then write the conditional demand functions, and the concealed labor income, when facing c ; d ; ; e t+1 ; z t ; I t ; as
The last equation also determines j-type's labor supply, I t + a j t =w j t : When incomes are observable, there will not be such an equation so that a j t = 0: Assigning I t to an individual then determines his labor supply, I t =w j t : As a …nal observation, it is crucially important to realize that, in this model, an individual's total expenditures on goods, his (actual) disposable income, is not just z t + b t+1 as it would be the case in the absence of misreporting. Instead, it will be equal to , where c is the tax rate on …rst-period consumption, d is the tax rate on second-period consumption, is the money growth (or contraction) rate, e j t+1 is the j-type's allotment of money injection (or money withdrawal) to be given in second period, z j t is the j-type's net-of-tax reported income, and I j t is the jtype's before-tax reported income; j = h;`. Reported income di¤ ers from actual earnings by the amount misreported, a j t . Under the perfect foresight assumption, the period by period equilibrium of this economy is characterized by equations (1)- (3), and (18)- (21), where the last four equations hold for both j = h;`.
Mechanism designer
It remains for us to specify how the mechanism designer chooses c ; d ; ; e In the steady-state, individual holdings of real cash balances remains constant over time:
The constancy of x j + a j implies, 18
This equation, along with the steady-state version of equation (2), establishes the relationship between r and the nominal interest rate, i, which also remains constant over time. We have
Observe also that q x t tends to, from (16),
In the steady state, the mechanism designer assigns I 
to denote the j-type's aggregate "observable" disposable income. 1 8 To see this, substitute from equation (6) into equation (5) and divide the resulting equation by pt+1 to get
Other equations of interest are the steady-state versions of the young j-type's intertemporal budget constraint (10) and his conditional indirect utility function (23) .
These are given by
where y j + a j f a j q x a j is the j-type's disposable income. To derive the steadystate version of the government's budget constraint, divide equation (24) by N t to write
Additionally, there is a relationship between money disbursements in real terms, b j ; and real cash balances, x j + a j : This is equal to (see the Appendix),
Finally, one can write the "jk-mimicker's" demand functions for c and d; his concealed labor income, and his conditional indirect utility function as,
We have, Proposition 2 Consider the overlapping generations model of Proposition 1. Assuming that the model has a steady-state equilibrium, it is characterized by equations (27)- (33) . Secondly, let v j and v jk , de…ned by equations (35) and (42), denote the conditional indirect utility function of the young j-type and jk-type agents; j = h,`and k 6 = j. Pareto-e¢ cient allocations are described by the maximization of P j=`;h j v j with respect to c ; d ; ; b j ; z j and I j ; subject to the government's budget constraint (36) , the money injection constraint (37) , and the self-selection constraints v h v h`a nd v` v`h.
The overlap between …scal and monetary instruments
We have seen that, in the steady state, the mechanism designer utilizes c ; d ; ; b j ; z j ; I j as his instruments but the welfare of the j-type is governed by q c ; q d ; q x ; y j ; I j : This suggests that, in the presence of a general income tax schedule and commodity taxes, there is some overlap between …scal and monetary instruments. This section addresses this question as it relates to the monetary distribution rule and monetary growth rate.
Monetary distribution rule
Consider, starting from any initial values for b h and b`, a change in money disbursements to the h-type and the`-type equal to db h and db`. Simultaneously, change z j according to dz j = db j . Now, with y j = z j + b j , dy j = 0, and q c ; q d ; q x ; y j ; I j remains intact.
Hence the utility of all agents in the economy including the mimickers, the jk-agents, remain the same. As a result, the incentive compatibility constraints continue to be satis…ed.
Second, with q c ; q d ; q x ; y j ; I j remaining unchanged, the j-type's demand for x and choice of a do not change either. Consequently, the changes in b j imply, from the money injection constraint (37) , that X j=`;h
Third, with q c ; q d ; q x ; y j ; I j remaining unchanged, the j-type's demand for c and d
does not change either. Hence, the only change in the government's revenue requirement comes from the changes in z j . From (36) and (43), we have
We thus have shown that the considered changes satisfy all the constraints that the economy faces but leaves every agent as well o¤ as he was before.
The import of all this is that the redistributive e¤ects of increasing the monetary disbursements to one type of agents and reducing them to the other, such that the aggregate money injection to the economy remains the same, can always be o¤set by changes in the individuals' income tax payments. The welfare of every agent remains una¤ected. This holds true whether the initial equilibrium, corresponding to the initial values of b h and b`, was optimal or not. This …nding is summarized as Proposition 3 Consider the steady-state equilibrium of Proposition 2. For a given monetary rate of growth, the …scal authority can o¤ set the redistributive e¤ ects of who gets the extra money (or loses the money that is withdrawn from the economy), by adjusting the individuals' income tax payments. All agents will continue to enjoy the same level of welfare.
We can now address the second dimension of monetary policy, i.e. the rate of growth of money.
Monetary growth rate
Consider now changing the monetary growth rate by d which also necessitates a change in b j given by db j : The …rst-order e¤ect of this change for a j-type individual is to change his e¤ective price of cash holdings, q x = i= (1 + i) ; and observable disposable income, y j = z j + b j : It is apparent that, whereas the …scal authority can adjust z j to keep y j constant, it has no instrument at its disposal which enables it to prevent q x from varying. Thus, this dimension of monetary policy has e¤ects which cannot be neutralized by the …scal authority.
That this aspect of monetary policy has a bite with no counterpart on …scal side is due to the limitation of tax instruments. To understand this point, suppose one could expand the armory of tax instruments to include a tax rate x on all real cash balances including cash held for concealment. 19 With x as an additional instrument, the e¤ective price of cash balances would become q x = (i + x ) = (1 + i). Now, concomitantly with the change in ; assume the …scal authority changes x and z j to keep q x and y j constant.
This would require a change in x according to 20
and a change in z j equal to dz j = db j . Given dy j = dq x = 0, and no change in I j ; the instituted changes would leave the utility of the h-types and the`-types intact. 21 The instituted changes would not a¤ect the utility of potential mimickers either so that the incentive compatibility constraints would remain satis…ed as well. To ensure the feasibility of the prescribed reform, one would need only to check the economy's resource constraint; or equivalently, the government's budget constraint, which in the presence of x becomes:
1 9 This is of course an implausible assumption and why we have not included x in the model presented in Section 2. Nonetheless, assuming such a tax instrument is available is a useful pedagogical device for the purposes of this section.
2 0 Observe …rst that a change in changes the nominal interest rate i; from equation (27) , by
Now for q x = (i + x ) = (1 + i) to remain constant, one must have
This can be rewritten as
Simplifying and rearranging the terms results
Finally, substituting for 1 + i in this expression gives the stipulated value for d x in the text. 2 1 Observe that if
x is levied on x only and not on cash balances kept for evasion, the e¤ective price of the latter remains at i= (1 + i). Under this scenario, no change in x can keep utilities constant and tax policy cannot neutralize monetary policy.
With no change in consumption goods and holdings of real balances, it is easy to show that dR = 0. 22 Consequently, one can always neutralize the e¤ects of monetary policy through tax policy.
These …ndings are summarized as:
Proposition 4 Consider the steady-state equilibrium of Proposition 2.
(i) The change in the rate of money growth has e¤ ects that cannot be o¤ set by the tax authority.
(ii) The reason that tax policy cannot neutralize the e¤ ects of changes in the money growth rate is the limitation of tax instruments. If the tax authority could levy a direct tax x on all money holdings, including the part kept for evasion, the opportunity cost of holding cash balances, q x ; would be determined jointly by the value of the monetary growth rate, ; and the tax on cash holdings, x , and given by q x = (i + x ) = (1 + i).
Under this circumstance, the tax authority would have enough instruments to undo all the redistributive e¤ ects of monetary policy.
We are now ready to investigate whether, in our model with nonlinear income tax and income misreporting, the Friedman rule (hereafter FR) is part of an optimal policy or not. According to the FR, optimality requires a zero opportunity cost of holding real cash balances. This is often stated in terms of choosing a rate of growth for money supply
Substituting from (44) for d x in this relationship and simplifying yields dR = 0:
such that the nominal interest rate is equal to zero. By targeting on one instrument, the rate of growth of money supply, this presentation of the FR recognizes the absence of a tax on real cash balances. And with x = 0, q x = i= (1 + i) so that i = 0 implies q x = 0.
Had it been possible to tax all real cash balances, the FR should have been stated as one of setting the money growth rate and the tax on real cash balances such that
In what follows we recognize the infeasibility of setting a uniform tax on all cash balances and investigate the optimality of the FR in terms of i = 0. However, one can use our construct to investigate the FR in terms of q x = 0.
Second-best characterization
In formulating the second-best optimization problem, we follow the common practice in the optimal income tax literature and ignore the "upward"incentive constraint, v` v`h;
assuming that it is automatically satis…ed. Thus, the only possible binding constraint will be that of the high-skilled agents mimicking low-skilled agents. Intuitively, this implies that we are concerned only with the realistic case of redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled agents.
Focusing on the steady-state equilibrium, the mechanism designer's problem can then be represented as:
subject to the government's budget constraint,
the money injection relationship (37), 
Tax characterization
With income misreporting one cannot rely on the standard argument in optimal tax models that justi…es normalizing, without loss of generality, one of the commodity tax rates to zero. 23 Consequently, the mechanism designer must optimize with respect to c ; d and . Denote compensated (Hicksian) variables by a "tilde", so that, for instance, e x j denotes the j-type's compensated demand for x. The following Proposition, proved in the Appendix, characterizes the optimal policy with respect to the choice of c ; d
and . c` c h` ; (46) Each of the equations (46)- (48) re ‡ects an optimal trade-o¤ that arises from a compensated marginal increase in a particular policy instrument: between public-budget e¤ects (represented by the left-hand side), and mimicking-deterring e¤ects (represented by the right-hand side 24 ). Note that, in reality, the last term within the square bracket on the left-hand sides of the three equations above captures the e¤ect on the moneyinjection constraint. However, due to the fact that an optimizing planner always chooses the policy instruments in such a way as to achieve = (see the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix for details), one can re-interpret the e¤ect on the money-injection constraint as a public-budget e¤ect.
Proposition 5 Let
X j j " c @e c j @q d + d 1 + r @ e d j @q d + 1 + g 1 + r 1 + @e x j @q d + @e a j @q d # = h` d` d h` ; (47) X j j " c @e c j @q x + d 1 + r @ e d j @q x + 1 + g 1 + r 1 + @e x j @q x + @e a j @q x # = h` h x`+ a` x h`+ a h` i ;(48
Is the Friedman rule optimal?
The literature on the golden rule has taught us that whenever the real interest rate r di¤ers from the population growth rate g, it is possible to exploit this di¤erence to 2 4 Apart from = that appears on the right-hand side of (48) whenever 6 = 0 (so that i = 0 emerges as a boundary solution.) increase the steady-state welfare through intergenerational wealth transfers. 25 In the absence of generation-speci…c lump-sum taxes, one way to do this is by levying distortionary commodity taxes that entail intergenerational wealth transfers. An in ‡ation tax, i.e. deviating from the FR as in Weiss (1980) , is one such mechanism. 26 Yet this reason for the suboptimality of the FR applies also in the absence of tax evasion (and even if the individuals within a generation are identical). Consequently, to isolate the implications of tax evasion, we proceed by assuming that r = g so that the economy is operating at its golden rule level. We do this to abstract away from, and not be distracted by, the golden rule considerations. Now setting r = g implies, from (27) , that = i. Under this circumstance the optimality of the FR, q x = i= (1 + i) = 0, is the same thing as the optimality of = 0. 
It then follows from Proposition 5 that to have the FR satis…ed, we must have
where
From the properties of the Slutsky matrix, the denominator in (52) 
Absence of tax evasion
To set the stage for the discussion of the import of tax evasion, we …rst consider the applicability of the FR in our model in the absence of tax evasion. Under this circumstance a j = a jk = 0.
Separable preferences
If preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, U = U (u (c; 
Non-separable preferences
In the absence of tax evasion tax normalization becomes possible. Setting d = 0, the tax optimization will be with respect to c and only and we have, corresponding to equations (49) and (51),
Eliminating c between these two equations yields,
Now recall that in da Costa and Werning (2008) Finally, notice that with no di¤erential commodity taxes in our model, c = d = 0
and reduces to
The x`> x h`a ssumption is then su¢ cient for > 0.
Tax evasion
Lemma 1, proved in the Appendix, provides the key to understanding the import of tax evasion for the results concerning optimality of the FR (and redundancy of commodity taxation result in general).
Lemma 1 Faced with the mechanism c ; d ; ; b h ; z h ; z`; I h ; I` , the h`-mimicker conceals a larger amount of income (a h`> a`) and has a larger disposable income than thè -type. The other is the result that the h`-mimicker has a lower labor supply than the true low-skilled agent. In the absence of tax evasion, this result follows because the mimicker, being more productive, works fewer hours to earn the same amount of income as the low-skilled. A result that allows one to compare the mimickers' and the low-skilled agents' demands for a particular good based on the complementarity/substitutability of that good with labor supply. That with income tax evasion a h`> a`implies one can no longer conclude that the labor supply of a low-skilled agent, L`= I`+ a` =w`, is unambiguously larger than that of an h`-mimicker, L h`= I`+ a h` =w h . 27 This ambiguity deprives the complementarity/substitutability assumption of its predictive power. We will see the relevance of this …nding for the optimality of the FR in the discussion of the non-separable preferences. 28 
Separable preferences
That Lemma 1 implies c`6 = c h`; d`6 = d h`; x`6 = x h`e ven if preferences are separable in labor supply and goods alerts us to the fact that in the presence of tax evasion expression A given by (53) can be equal to zero only by chance for some special type of preferences. That is, as a general rule, the FR does not hold as an interior solution.
Indeed, one can easily prove that with separability if all pairs of goods are Hicksian substitutes, the FR can never hold as an interior solution. Interestingly, it cannot hold as a boundary solution either. To prove this, recall that from Lemma 1, a h`> as o that an h`-mimicker has a larger disposable income than a true low-skilled agent:
Moreover, with separability, labor supply does not directly a¤ect the way income is spent across goods. Thus, assuming 2 7 More precisely, the fact that a mimicker has a higher wage rate exerts both an income and a substitution e¤ect on labor supply. The income e¤ect is negative and tends to make the mimicker's labor supply lower than that of a low-skilled. The substitution e¤ect, on the other hand, may be either positive or negative (for a detailed analytical proof of this claim, see section 2.2 of Blomquist et al., 2011). If the substitution e¤ect is positive and large enough, a mimicker's labor supply will exceed the labor supply of a true low-skilled. 2 8 Lemma 1 also sheds light on the reason for our earlier observation regarding the relevance of tax normalization. With income misreporting, even a uniform commodity tax rate can have a bite and normalizing one of the commodity tax rates to zero is no longer a harmless assumption. To see this, note that according to this Lemma, income misreporting implies that a mimicker has a larger disposable income than a true low-skilled agent. Now start from an initial equilibrium where commodity taxes are not used and consider introducing a small uniform commodity tax at rate on all goods, while at the same time raising the after-tax reported income z j , j =`; h, to leave the utility of the non-mimicking agents unchanged. [In our setting, this requires adjusting z j by dz
With the h`-mimickers'disposable income exceeding that of true low-skilled agents, and for simplicity assuming i = 0, the total expenditure of the mimicker on goods c and d exceeds that of a true low-skilled agent:
Consequently, the increase in z`is not enough to fully compensate the mimicker for the introduction of the uniform commodity tax. As a result, this reform would make the h`-mimicker worse-o¤ and slackens the previously binding self-selection constraint. This means that, in the presence of tax evasion, the absolute price levels of c and d matter and one cannot simply normalize one of the prices.
all goods are normal, c h`> c`, d h`> d`, and x h`+ a h` x`+ a`. 29 Now, assuming all pairs of goods are Hicksian substitutes, the bracketed expressions to the left of c` c h` (53) (48) yields,
The FR is thus violated in the presence of tax evasion because, as we have seen, the right-hand side of the above equation is negative. 32 Indeed, given that @e x j =@q x < 0 2 9 The possibility for equality arises if agents are over-reporting so that = 0 and if both x`and x hh appen to be at their satiation level. 3 0 Remember that, under separability and with income misreporting, c` c h`< 0 and d` d h`< 0. 3 1 This can be easily seen by setting = 0 in (46)- (47) and remembering that c` c h`< 0 and d` d h`< 0. 3 2 Observe that in the absence of commodity taxes, low-ability agents (as well as h`-mimickers) face and @e a j =@q x < 0, the optimal solution for is positive. On the other hand, without tax evasion, the right-hand side collapses to zero so that = 0 and the FR holds.
Non-separable preferences
With non-separable preferences, tax evasion implies that the FR may or may not hold as a boundary solution. Inspecting the various terms in A, as given by (53), reveals that A may be positive or negative depending on the various substitutability/complementarity relationships between goods and between goods and labor supply. However, unlike the case without tax evasion, one cannot establish simple su¢ cient conditions for A > 0 (and the optimality of the FR as a boundary solution). The problem is that even full knowledge of the substitutability/complementarity relationship of labor supply to c; d; and x leaves the signs of c` c h` ; d` d h` and x`+ a`
x h`+ a h` in A indeterminate. In the presence of tax evasion, as we mentioned in our discussion of Lemma 1, either the low-skilled or the mimicker can have a larger labor supply. 33 The results of this section are summarized as:
Proposition 6 Consider the steady-state equilibrium of Proposition 2 at its golden rule level:
(i) The Friedman rule does not generally hold as an interior solution.
(ii) The Friedman rule may or may not hold as a boundary solution.
(iii) A necessary condition for the FR to hold as a boundary solution under separability of preferences between labor supply and goods is that at least one pair of goods are Hicksian complements.
(iv) Whether or not complementarity between real cash balances and labor supply favors the optimality of the FR as a boundary solution depends on whether the labor supply of a low-skilled agent exceeds or falls short of the labor supply of an h`-mimicker.
a positive marginal income tax rate so that they will never be over-reporting. Consequently, > 0 and even if x`and x h`h appen to be at their satiation level, the right-hand side is always strictly negative. 3 3 The problem is simpler with separable preferences because we need not know which agents have a larger or smaller labor supply. It simply does not matter.
(v) Even in the absence of tax evasion, complementarity between labor supply and consumption of real cash balances does not guarantee the optimality of the Friedman rule as a boundary solution.
Robustness of the results
This Section brie ‡y discusses how our results generalize to settings characterized by di¤erent modeling assumptions. In particular, we will consider the consequences of (i) increasing the number of agents' types, (ii) modeling evasion as a risky activity, and (iii) allowing for the possibility of commodity tax evasion.
Increasing the number of agents'types
Although our results are derived in the context of a two-group model, they generalize to models with more than two groups. The two-group speci…cation is a simple yet useful device that allows economizing on notation while at the same time shedding light on the important mechanisms underlying the planner's problem. Our main goal in this paper is to examine if the FR is optimal in a Mirrleesian tax problem with income misreporting.
And what we have found is that the answer is in general in the negative with the underlying reason being that tax evasion allows mimickers to have a higher disposable income than the true low-skilled. 34 Exploiting this property via deviating from the FR allows the mechanism designer to improve welfare by weakening an otherwise binding incentive compatibility constraint. Speci…cally, with two types of agents, there is only one binding self-selection constraint. Under the so-called "normal" case where redistribution goes from the highto the low-skilled, the binding self-selection constraint is the one requiring high-skilled agents not to have an incentive to mimic low-skilled agents by choosing the income point intended solely for the latter. The potential role for exploiting a deviation from the FR as a deterrent to mimicking comes, as we have seen, from the fact that with income misreporting a high-skilled mimicker would have a larger disposable income than a low-skilled agent. In turn, this implies that the overall demand for cash balances by a mimicker is larger than that of a low-skilled agent.
In a more general model with n > 2 groups of agents, the same type of mechanism will be at work. It is true that one would have n 1 > 1 binding self-selection constraints.
However, these binding constraints would all be running downwards, linking pairs of adjacent types. And each of these constraints would share the properties of the single self-selection constraint characterizing our two-type model. 35 
Evasion as a risky activity
Another assumption of our model has been that income misreporting is a costly but riskless activity. As an alternative, one may model income misreporting as a risky activity which can be detected through costly audits by the tax authority and punished along a penalty function. This is the approach taken, among others, by Cremer and Gahvari (1996) and Schroyen (1997) within the strand of the optimal general income tax literature. 36 The question is if this latter modeling strategy may change the nature of our qualitative results regarding the optimal monetary policy. The answer to this question, we argue below, is in the negative.
To this end, we adapt Cremer and Gahvari's (1995) approach to our setting. Let p j denote the probability that an agent reporting income I j is audited and P j denote the additional payment he has to make upon being audited. If P j > 0 this is the unpaid tax plus the penalty; if P j < 0 this is a reward for being subjected to an audit while 3 5 There is one caveat. Whereas in a two-type model a pooling equilibrium-with both types of agents choosing the same income point-is necessarily suboptimal, in a model with more than two types the optimum may deviate from a fully separating equilibrium and can feature partial pooling. If this is the case, an additional advantage of deviating from the FR is that it may help separating the agents'types who are pooled at the pure income tax optimum. 3 6 Both papers ignore commodity taxes and focus on the design of optimal nonlinear income tax and audit policy in a two-group model of risk-averse agents who, as in our paper, di¤er only in terms of market ability (skill). The main di¤erence between the two contributions concerns the modeling of the penalty function. In Cremer and Gahvari (1995) , the penalty policy is not restricted and is designed as part of the optimal tax/audit/…ne policy. This allows them to directly control the underreporting behavior of the agents which implies that in equilibrium no agent has an incentive to evade. In Schroyen (1997) , on the other hand, the penalty system is predetermined with …nes being proportional to the evaded income. Hence evasion may occur at the solution to the planner's optimal tax problem. innocent (i.e. earning one's reported income). 37 Moreover, as in Cremer and Gahvari (1995) , assume that, if found guilty, an agent will have all his income con…scated by the tax authority. Further, for simplicity, ignore commodity taxes.
Assume preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, and de…ne:
Expressions (57)- (58) (59) represents the expected utility of a j-type agent who reports his income to be I j but earns I j + a j (concealing a j units of income from the tax authority). Similarly, expression (60) represents the expected utility of a j-type agent who masquerades as a k-type by reporting income I k but earns I k + a jk (concealing a jk units of income).
Observe that in writing these expressions, we have normalized v (q x ; 0) = 0. subject to the government's budget constraint,
the money injection relationship (37),
( 1 ) and the following set of "moral hazard" constraints:
Notice in particular the appearance in the above problem of three new constraints, the moral hazard constraints, requiring that in equilibrium no agent has an incentive to conceal income from the tax authority. As shown by Cremer and Gahvari (1995) , in their model without money, in all the solutions to the planner's optimal tax problem either EU h V h`b inds, EU` V`binds, or both. 38 Which implies, as we argue below, that in our model with money the FR is never optimal.
To understand the point, start from an initial equilibrium when the above problem is solved subject to the additional constraint that i = 0. Then consider a marginal increase in i accompanied with the necessary adjustments in b j and z j , j = h;`, that ensures the money injection relationship and the government's budget constraint continue to be satis…ed while the expected utilities of non-mimicking agents, EU h and EU`, remain unchanged. 39 While this reform has, by construct, no …rst-order welfare e¤ect on the h-and the`-types, it makes the tax evaders worse o¤. This is because a person who reports I j , j = h;`, but earns a di¤erent level of income has a larger disposable income, and thus a larger consumption of cash balances, than the corresponding non-evading agent. He thus needs more compensation, to remain at his previous utility level, than that required by the corresponding non-evading agent. Consequently, V h ; V`, and V hà ll decline. Given that at least one of the constraints EU h V h`a nd EU` V`is always binding, that binding constraint slackens. Increasing the growth rate of money supply will then lead to a higher level of welfare.
Thus, the main di¤erence between modeling income misreporting as a riskless or a risky activity is that in the latter case, allowing for a nonlinear penalty policy, no agent is misreporting income at the optimum. Nonetheless, the results obtained for the riskless case, on which our paper has focused, generalize to the case where evasion is a risky activity. In the riskless case, deviating from the FR helps weaken the binding selfselection constraint; in the risky case, deviating from the FR helps weaken the binding moral hazard constraints.
Commodity tax evasion
In our analysis we have disregarded the possibility of commodity tax evasion. But suppose that instead, in addition to income misreporting, consumers can evade paying sales taxes by concealing their purchases from the tax authority. Assume also that, as in Cremer and Gahvari (1993), they are able to do so if they incur a concealment cost which is commodity-speci…c, increasing and convex in the amount concealed. For any given tax rate on a commodity, consumers will conceal their purchases up to a point where the private marginal resource cost of concealing coincides with the commodity tax rate. Beyond this point, any additional purchases of the good will not be concealed and will be subject to its commodity tax rate.
For the points our paper is making, allowing for commodity taxation makes no di¤erence except that the distortionary e¤ect of taxes is perceived di¤erently by the social planner. A marginal compensated increase in the tax rate on a given good will have two e¤ects on the tax revenue generated from that good. A …rst standard e¤ect comes from the reduction of the demand for that good (depending on the own-price substitution e¤ect). The second, non standard, e¤ect comes from a further reduction in the units of the good that are taxed (due to the fact that concealment becomes more bene…cial to consumers). To sum, allowing for the possibility of commodity tax evasion a¤ects the magnitude of the derivatives of the compensated demands appearing in the formulas presented in Section 6 but it does not ultimately alter the qualitative results concerning the desirability to deviate from the FR. 
Summary and conclusion
where comparing (A3) with (A5) reveals that = :
By way of substituting for i from (27) in (16),
(1 + r) (1 + ) (1 + g) (1 + r) (1 + ) = 1 1 + g (1 + r) (1 + ) :
Di¤erentiating with respect to yields
Using @x j =@ = @x j =@q x (@q x =@ ) and @a j =@ = @a j =@q x (@q x =@ ), one can then derive the following expressions, Next, di¤erentiate v j and v jk , as speci…ed by equations (35) and (42) 
Equations (46)- (48) 
Observe that the normality of y also implies that M RS yI y; I; w j ; a is increasing in a: This happens both because an increase in a, for a given I and w j , implies a higher labor supply, and because it implies a larger disposable income, y + a f (a) q x a.
Finally, from equation (13), M RS yI y; I; w j ; a = 1 f 0 (a) q x :
Hence a low-skilled agent when faced with the quadruple (q c ; q d ; q x ; y`; I`), implied by the mechanism c ; d ; ; b h ; z h ; z`; I h ; I` , chooses a to satisfy, M RS yI y`; I`; w`; a = 1 f 0 (a)
On the other hand, the h`-mimicker chooses a such that M RS yI y`; I`; w h ; a = 1 f 0 (a)
4 0 The single-crossing or "agent monotonicity"condition requires that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income, y and I in this case, to be decreasing in wage so that at any (y; I) bundle, the high-ability agent will have a ‡atter indi¤erence curve than the low-ability agent. In this way, they can cross only once. See, e.g., Salanié (2011) .
Denote the solution to (A34) by a`and the solution to (A35) by a h`: It follows from (A34)-(A35) that M RS yI y`; I`; w`; a` + f 0 a` = M RS yI y`; I`; w h ; a h` + f 0 a h` :
At the same time, the single-crossing property implies that for the same value of a; M RS yI y`; I`; w`; a > M RS yI y`; I`; w h ; a ; or M RS yI y`; I`; w`; a` + f 0 a` > M RS yI y`; I`; w h ; a` + f 0 a` :
Substituting from (A36) for the left-hand side of (A37), M RS yI y`; I`; w h ; a h` + f 0 a h` > M RS yI y`; I`; w h ; a` + f 0 a` :
Now with M RS yI y; I; w j ; a increasing in a as shown earlier and f 0 (a) increasing in a, due to convexity of f (a), it follows from the above inequality that a h`> a`.
